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Wiek dwudziesty pierwszy odznacza się rosnącym zainteresowaniem wykorzystywaniem orbity 
okołoziemskiej w różnych celach – liczba satelitów przyrasta zatem w ogromnym tempie. Jedną ze 
szczególnych cech ostatnich kilku dekad „ery kosmicznej” jest relatywnie szybkie rozprzestrzenia-
nie się w świecie aplikacji satelitarnych. Oznacza to, że przestrzeń kosmiczna jest wykorzystywana 
już nie tylko przez najbardziej zaawansowane technologicznie kraje. Najbardziej znaczącym przy-
kładem tego procesu są Indie. Kraj ten rozpoczął aktywność w sferach związanych z przestrzenią 
kosmiczną już w 1963 r., by pod koniec dwudziestego stulecia, po trzech dekadach trudnego roz-
woju, osiągnąć status mocarstwa kosmicznego. Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy wojskowej strony pro-
gramu kosmicznego Indii, która jest relatywnie słabo rozwinięta w porównaniu do możliwości 
i potrzeb kraju. 
Słowa kluczowe: stosunki międzynarodowe ● bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe ● program ko-
smiczny ● Indie. 
 
Abstract 
The 21st century has been marked by the increasing use of Earth's orbit for various purposes, as the 
number of active satellites are growing by dozens or even hundreds every year. One of the specific 
features of the last few decades of Space Age is the relatively quick dissemination of satellite appli-
cations around the world. This means that the outer space is being used not only by technologically 
advanced powers. India is the most prominent example of that process. India had started its space-
related activities as early as 1963 and became a space-faring nation by the end of the 20th century 
following over thirty years of painstaking development. This article refers to India's military-related 
space activities that appear somewhat less developed compared to the country's capabilities and 
needs. 
Keywords: International Relations ● International Security ● Space Security● Indian Space Pro-
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The 21st century has been marked by the increasing use of Earth’s orbit for various pur-
poses, as the number of active satellites are growing by dozens or even hundreds every 
year. One of the specific features of the last few decades of Space Age is the relatively 
quick dissemination of satellite applications around the world. It means that the outer 
space is being used not only by technologically developed powers. India is the most prom-
inent example of that process. India had started its space-related activities as early as in 
1963 and became a space-faring nation by the end of the 20th century following over thirty 
years of painstaking development.  
One of the specific attributes of the Indian space programme is its mainly civilian 
orientation, as it has always been primarily considered part of the overall development ef-
fort of the country. Indeed, many of the orbital applications are dual-use technologies 
which may be utilized to fulfil military tasks as well. Still, they are not as effective as pur-
pose-built ones, which are in short supply in India’s quite vast spacecraft inventory.  
On the other hand, there are many areas within the realm of national security where 
the use of orbital systems would be of great benefit. It could enhance the effectiveness of 
many activities and allow to deal with emerging problems quicker and in a more compre-
hensive manner. From the point of view of India’s national security, there are three com-
plementary arguments which should stimulate increased interest in the military 
applications of orbital systems. Firstly, the competition with China, the dangerous relations 
with Pakistan, and other security concerns require augmenting military capabilities. Se-
condly, the engineering capacity of Indian private companies and state agencies has steadi-
ly grown, which enables the creation of increasingly mature space applications. And thirdly, 
New Delhi pursues an increasingly active foreign policy which needs enhanced instru-
ments, including the effective military capable of executing various combat and noncom-
bat missions in the fast-evolving security environment. 
This article is aimed at analyzing, in the most general terms, the Indian space pro-
gramme. Specifically, we will try to answer the question, how it fits into the requirements 
of the country’s national security, mainly from the military perspective. To do so, we will 
firstly depict in brief the main security problems that New Delhi has faced so far, 




emphasizing their military dimension. Next, we will characterize the Indian space program 
with particular attention paid to its applications related to national security. And finally, we 
will try to propose a general assessment of the role of outer space as an instrument of 
national security of India from the military perspective. This last part will also be supple-
mented with some thoughts about future developments and prospects. 
This article follows the realist perspective as it refers mostly to the military sphere, 
strategic considerations and the impact of technology on security-related issues. The value 
of realist thinking concerning these subjects manifests itself twofold. Firstly, as much as 
the primary goal of the presented research is to describe a part of the military instrument 
of a particular country – realist perspective provides a useful theoretical framework for 
that. Secondly, this instrument is portrayed against the background of India’s great power, 
aspirations, and characteristics of the country’s strategic environment – realist perspective 
is particularly suitable for that purpose. We believe that this approach suits the research 
goals best. The methodology is based on desk research, which entails an analysis of publicly 
available data and assessment of the existing literature on the subject. 
 
1. The Main Problems of India’s National Security  
The international position of India is being labelled with the use of various expressions, but 
usually, the term “power” is invoked in many contexts. We agree that “leading power”2 is 
the best phrase coined until now, for such wording is undoubtedly legitimate, especially if 
we consider the potential of that country3. And so, India: 
− is the second most populous nation-state in the world; with high dynamics of 
growth, it is poised to overtake the leader, i.e., China, in the coming years; 
− is the third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity; and 
− has the fifth biggest military budget in the world.  
Furthermore, geography gives India an opportunity to dominate the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR) and Southern Asia, as this country is centrally located within both regions. And finally, 
India’s political tradition displays a particular feature that translates into its current political 
 
2 M. Tewari, B. Gopalaswamy, Transforming India from a Balancing to Leading Power, Atlantic Council, June 
2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Transforming_India_from_a_Balancing_to_Le-
ading_Power_web_0622.pdf (accessed: 22.02.2018). 
3 A. Ayres, Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power, “Foreign Affairs” 2017, vol. 96, no. 6, pp. 83 passim. 




culture – it is a firm conviction that the country has an exceptional role to play in the inter-
national arena. That is why, as some scholars observe, India “[…] has always aspired to the 
position of world power”4. 
Today, these ambitions come true, as India performs increasingly assertive policies, 
striving to shape the regional order increasingly effectively, while at the same time securing 
the global position as one of the most important players and a welcomed partner. What is 
more, India has recently emphasized more openly the role of hard power5 in its policies. 
This does not, however, imply a withdrawal from the traditional pacifist attitude towards 
the use of force, which is deeply rooted in that nation’s political culture and identity. On 
the other hand, India is still a poor country, despite seven-decade-long development ef-
forts, and it still cannot fully subjugate its own problems. That is why sometimes it is said 
that there are two Indias at the same time6 – the modern one, expanding and evolving, and 
another which is traditionally poor, backward, and hopeless. 
India has to deal with the very complex security environment, and this entails a num-
ber of internal and external problems, dangers, and opportunities. As we have already no-
ticed, India is a vast country with numerous domestic predicaments and a multitude of 
external threats. These attributes are matched with an optimistic prospect for internal de-
velopment and the growing international relevance. It is, therefore, impossible to describe 
in this paper all issues of national security – we will restrict the discussion to a general out-
line and focus on military-related matters. 
First of all, there is a vast compound of problems associated with domestic security. 
India is still a relatively poor country with countless economic and social tensions. The rapid 
population growth, great social and economic inequalities, insufficient infrastructure, and 
economic weaknesses of many of the country’s regions have contributed to the immense 
potential of social unrest, organized crime, terrorism and anti-state subversive resent-
ments. That is why the human dimension of India’s national security is marked with serious 
threats that undermine the country’s stability and development efforts. The deteriorating 
natural environment also adds up to the already enumerated internal problems, being at 
 
4 J. Zajączkowski, Indie w stosunkach międzynarodowych [India in International Relations], Warszawa 2008, 
p. 100. 
5 S. Joshi, India Flexes Its Muscle, “Foreign Affairs”, June 23, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/in-
dia/2015-06-23/india-flexes-its-muscle (accessed: 21.02.2018) 
6 C. R. Kaye, J. S. Nye Jr., A. Ayres, Working With a Rising India. A Joint Venture for the New Century, Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015, p. 9. 




the same time an important issue by itself. This enormous set of difficulties is certainly in-
tertwined with an external dimension as the Indian economy is tightly coupled with the 
global market. Indian society is, to a great extent “connected” globally, and crime, terror-
ism, and subversion are also linked to the events and processes that occur outside India. 
In the international arena, which we are going to consider more specifically, there 
are first of all global socio-economic developments that the Indian policy must take into 
consideration. Globalization, rapid development of new technologies, quick local and 
global evolution of individual and group identities, and a rapid increase of wealth in devel-
oping countries pose both dangers and opportunities. They also bring multiple threats 
along with chances to augment the country’s growth and to increase its power. There is no 
need to describe all accompanying issues, suffice to say that they give the essential back-
ground for subsequent analysis of more detailed developments. 
To begin with, we have to identify a cluster of issues associated with China and Pa-
kistan, the actors that are often depicted together from the Indian perspective7. It makes 
sense not only because both countries closely co-operate but also because, in both in-
stances, territorial disputes are the most tangible core of their disagreements with India. 
However, there are also significant distinctions between those two countries, both from 
the Indian point of view and regarding the way China and Pakistan perceive India. The dis-
pute over Kashmir is a matter of fundamental importance for Pakistan as it reaches the 
heart of its national identity. What is more, Islamabad understands well its inferiority – Pa-
kistan is much weaker than India by any economic and military standards, save nuclear 
weapons. The Chinese perception is quite different – a border dispute with the southern 
neighbour is of secondary importance, and Beijing does not feel a substantial military 
threat from that direction. However, on the other hand, an increasingly assertive China8 
considers India as an important peer competitor in Asia and elsewhere. Although the Indian 
economic potential is still much smaller than that of China, and New Delhi’s ability to pro-
ject power, be it hard or soft, is limited too, the Chinese authorities expect them to grow. 
This makes India, both for natural reasons and because of its ambitions, an active opponent 
 
7 J. Zajączkowski, op.cit,  p. 151. 
8 See for example: B. Gopalaswamy, R. A. Manning, The Sino-Indian Clash and the New Geopolitics of the Indo-
Pacific, The Atlantic Council, November 2017. 




of the Chinese strategic aspirations in Asia and IOR9. This adds up to the intensifying eco-
nomic competition and translates into the struggle for political influence in the region10, 
and it contributes especially to the growing rivalry in the Indian Ocean and adjacent quar-
ters11. Furthermore, it is worth to remember that Indo-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani antago-
nisms have important nuclear dimensions12. 
While analyzing the complex situation in Southern Asia, it is also worth mentioning 
the American presence there. The United States has been deeply involved in that region 
having its strategic interests there. On the one hand, Washington has been in relatively 
good, although steadily deteriorating relations with Islamabad; on the other hand, it feels 
increasingly compelled to compete with Beijing. At the same time, the Americans have of-
fered New Delhi broad, although still vague, co-operation opportunities13. 
The external dimension of national security of India also involves some important 
issues related to the international trade, especially the ones concerning the security of ma-
ritime trade routes, which still bear 80% of world trade’s volume and 70% of its value14. It is 
essential from the Indian point of view because the country’s vital exports, such as raw 
materials, chemicals, textiles, and machinery, travel mostly along sea lines originating in 
large maritime ports: Mumbai, Paradip, Kandla or Jawaharlal Nehru Container Terminal in 
Mumbai – the 33rd biggest in the world15. Imports are even more critical for the Indian 
economy, especially for the energy sector, as the country is the third largest producer of 
energy in the world, generating 723.9 Mtoe, which represents 5.5% of the world production. 
 
9 See, for example: C. Wagner, S. Tripathi, India’s Response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, SWP Com-
ment 7, January 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/com-
ments/2018C07_wgn_Tripathi.pdf (accessed: 26.02.2018). 
10 A. Small, A Backlash to Belt and Road, “Foreign Affairs”, February 16, 2018, https://www.foreignaffa-
irs.com/articles/china/2018-02-16/backlash-belt-and-road (dostep: 21.02.2018). 
11 E. Albert, Competition in the Indian Ocean, Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2016, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/competition-indian-ocean (22.02.2018). 
12 See for example: G. Kampani, B. Gopalaswamy, Asia in the “Second Nuclear Age”, Atlantic Council, Novem-
ber 2017. 
13 See for example: A. B. Carter: America's New Strategic Partner?, “Foreign Affairs”, July/August 2006 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/americas-new-strategic-partner (assessed: 
25.02.2018). 
14 Review of Maritime Transport 2017, UNCTAD, October 2017, https://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uplo-
ads/2017/10/UNCTAD-Review-of-Maritime-Transport-2017-2017_10.pdf (24.02.2018). 
15 Ibidem. 




Around 47% of this energy is produced with the use of fuel imported through sea lines – 91% 
of crude oil, 45% of natural gas and 30% of coal16. 
The Indian Ocean is also one of the most important sea transit routes in the world. 
It is particularly crucial for imports and exports to and from the Far East and South-East 
Asia, where first-class trade powers: China and Japan, and second-class ones: Vietnam, Sin-
gapore, Republic of Korea and Indonesia are located. The distinct feature of the Indian 
Ocean is that its two main entrances used by commercial shipping are also the most signi-
ficant world trade chokepoints: the Arab Sea with the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of 
Aden in the west, and the Strait of Malacca in the east. The latter is, for example, crossed 
by 17 million barrels of crude oil every day, bound mostly for China and Japan – that is, more 
than a fourth of the world overall maritime trade of this commodity17. By its potential and 
geography, India is destined to control these sea routes, and it is continuously interacting 
with other countries which are also interested in a safe and uninterrupted flow of goods 
through the Indian Ocean. These interactions are increasingly important as the trade grows 
and, simultaneously, as India asserts its position of maritime power. And here we can also 
notice its important relations with the United States, still dominant in the world ocean, and 
with China, which is actively penetrating this area, considering it a sphere of its vital inte-
rests. This dimension of the Indian relations with the world is marked by competition, with 
a potential of conflict, and co-operation, with prospects for abundant benefits – it is also 
heavily laden with military-related implications. 
Summing up the Indian national security agenda from the military perspective, it 
should be noted first of all that the dispute with Pakistan is surely the most direct and tan-
gible threat. It is not only the interstate regular struggle marked with military and political 
tensions, but it also has an important asymmetrical aspect which manifests itself in terror-
ism and subversive activities with the Indian soil. Therefore, both countries, Pakistan in par-
ticular, perceive their mutual relations as a source of clear and present danger and the main 
reference point for current policies pertaining to the national security domain. It is also 
worth reminding again that both countries possess nuclear weapons and sufficient means 
 
16 All data from: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017, BP, June 2017, https://www.bp.com/con-
tent/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-
energy-2017-full-report.pdf (22.02.2018).  
17 As of 2015, see: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S. Energy Information Agency, July 25, 2017, p. 2., 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepo-
ints/wotc.pdf (accessed: 24.02.1018).  




of delivery. Furthermore, the Pakistani nuclear doctrine envisages the first use of nuclear 
weapons in case of war with another nuclear-armed state18 – which, of course, means India. 
The Chinese dimension of Indian security is less an issue of a direct threat, and more of 
a long-standing and prospective competition for influence within the IOR and South Asia, 
which also encompasses essential issues of maritime control. Atop it all, the American pre-
sence and Washington’s interests and policies loom over the region. 
On the basis of the abovementioned problems, a list of the following security issues 
that should be addressed by current policies includes: 
− Nuclear weapons of China and Pakistan, 
− Conventional arms balance vis-a-vis Pakistan, 
− the Chinese military potential in the neighbouring regions,   
− effectiveness of the Indian armed forces as a deterrent and as a warfighting tool 
capable of conducting extensive non-combat operations as well,  
− effective control of the Indian Ocean, 
− Irregular warfare and counterterrorism, 
− cybersecurity, 
− socio-economic domestic problems, and 
− environmental concerns. 
All these topics must be addressed by the nation’s security strategy with the use of 
various tools and methods, according to the doctrines and policies devised by the authori-
ties. Almost every one of them has some military aspects, which means that the armed 
forces may be instrumental in achieving the respective goals and aims. The military is, 
therefore, an instrument supposed not only to conduct combat operations but, with in-
creasing frequency, to perform non-combat duties as well. The latter means day-to-day 
missions to support the capabilities and readiness of combat components, and the use of 





18 P. K. Kerr, M. B. Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2016, p. 10, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf (accessed: 20.02.2018). 




2. The Indian Space Systems Inventory – Military Applications 
The development of technology which finally led to the creation of the Indian space system 
had begun in 1963 with the testing of sounding rockets, but the long-term goal was to es-
tablish an indigenous space launch capacity. It is worth noticing that the Indian space pro-
gramme did not have military origins, that were the case of its American and Soviet 
analogues; the development of the Indian ballistic missiles officially started as late as 
198519. Currently, all space activities are conducted under the supervision of the Indian 
Space Research Organization20 established in 1969. 
The Space Launch Vehicle − 3 (SLV–3), the earliest successful Indian orbital launch 
system experimental in itself, was first tested in July 1980 – this date marks India’s emer-
gence as a space-faring nation. Only four launches (two of them successful) were under-
taken, resulting in the placing of two small satellites in orbit21. The next, still experimental, 
Advanced Space Launch Vehicle, flew four times with one success22, but its development 
was terminated in 1994. The first fully operational and effective launch system, the Polar 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), had been first tested in September 1993 and scored its first 
success the next year, on October 15. The PSLV is able to lift payloads of over 1,000 kg into 
orbit23. This is a very reliable system, already used 42 times, 39 of them with full success; 
many more are planned for the future24. By 2001, the Indian inventory of space launchers 
was supplemented by a much more powerful rocket, the Geostationary Launch Vehicle 
(GSLV), that can send a payload of 5,000 kg to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO); this vehicle is 
also able to place over 2,000 kg in the Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO). It has already 
managed to score 6 fully successful flights out of 11 attempted, and more are scheduled for 
the future25. The newest Indian orbital launch system, first tested in 2014, is the GLSV Mk 
III. Despite the name, it is essentially a new design, capable of lifting 10,000 kg to LEO and 
 
19 R. Nagappa, Development of Space Launch Vehicles in India, “Astropolitics” 2016, vol 14, no. 2-3, p. 158, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2016.1244877 (accessed: 21.02.2018). 
20 ISRO, https://www.isro.gov.in (accessed: 24.02.2018). 
21 SLV-3, Gunther’s Space Page, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau_det/slv-3.htm (accessed: 24.02.2018). 
22 ASLV, Department of Space, Indian Space research Organization, https://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/aslv 
(accessed: 21.02.2018). 
23 R. Nagappa, Development of Space Launch Vehicles in India, “Astropolitics” 2016, vol 14, no. 2-3, p. 167, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2016.1244877 (accessed: 21.02.2018). 
24 As of February 2018, see: PSLV, Gunther’s Space Page 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/pslv.htm (ac-
cessed: 21.02.2018). 
25 GSLV, Gunther’s Space Page 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/pslv.htm, (accessed: 21.02.2018). 




4,000 to GTO26. Note that this rocket, already launched successfully twice with some more 
flights planned27, is more powerful than the Soyuz, the Russian space “workhorse”. India 
is also developing next-generation launch systems which will have even better capabilities. 
Open source satellite catalogues indicate 50 orbital spacecrafts registered in India, 
out of the overall number of 1,738 active satellites. Additionally, there are three more that 
are registered as Indian/French and Indian/Canadian ones. Only four of Indian orbiters are 
labelled as “military”, three are marked as “earth observation” and one as “communica-
tions”. Another 44 are categorized as “government”, of which 15 are “earth observation” 
craft including weather satellites, 16 are “communications” systems, and seven are used 
for “positioning”28. 
The abovementioned numbers do not fully represent the satellite capabilities that 
may be used for national security, including military purposes. That is why we will now de-
scribe Indian satellite constellations with respect to their functions and potential military 
applications. This description will follow the ISRO classification with some additional data 
derived from other sources.  
1. The Indian National Satellite System (INSS) currently comprises 16 active spacecrafts lo-
cated in the Geostationary Orbit (GEO)29 which are suitable to carry out various tasks. Most 
of them are used for communications, but there are also weather satellites in the system; 
some of the others may perform disaster warning and support search and rescue (SAR) 
operations. The Indian government agencies have manufactured them in co-operation 
with public state-owned broadcasters. One of the satellites officially listed in this constel-
lation, the GSAT-7, is catalogued30 as a military one. It is a multiband communications sat-
ellite used exclusively by the Indian Navy31. 
 
26 GSLV Mk III, Indian Space Research Organization 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/gslv-mk-iii, (acces-
sed: 21.02.2018).  
27 GSLV Mk.3 (LVM-3), Gunther’s Space Page, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/gslv-mk3.htm (accessed: 
24.02.2018). 
28 All the numbers extracted from: UCS Satellite Database, Union of Concerned Scientists, 31 August 2017, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database# (dostep: 21.02.2018).  
29 Communication Satellites; ISRO 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/communication-satellites (acces-
sed: 21.02.2018). 
30 Every instance that we use the word “catalogue” it refers to: UCS Satellite Database, op.cit. 
31 GSat 7, 7A (Insat 4F, Rukmini), Gunther’s Space Page 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/gsat-7.htm 
(accessed: 21.02.2018). 




2. The Indian Earth Observation satellite system is composed of four weather satellites, 
which are also part of the abovementioned geostationary constellation INSS, and 13 addi-
tional satellites with much lower sun-synchronous orbits32. This constellation is able to con-
duct various observation tasks with the use of optical and radar sensors for cartography, 
oceanography, and other scientific purposes. Among them, the Cartosat 2 subsystem, 
which currently is comprised of 6 satellites, features panchromatic imaging with 1m reso-
lution33, which represents the current worldwide standard. The Cartosat 2A craft is cata-
logued as “military”, which may suggest that it is used exclusively by the military, al-though 
it does not differ from the other members of the family, at least officially. ISRO also lists 
Risat-1 and Risat-2 as earth observation satellites, which are catalogued as “military” and 
attributed to the Ministry of Defence. They are radar imaging systems using modern syn-
thetic aperture sensors, of which Risat-1 is fully made in India, while Risat-2 is equipped with 
the more advanced radar produced in Israel34.  
3. India is currently in the final stage of the establishment of its own satellite navigation 
system, called the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS or NavIC35). It cur-
rently comprises seven satellites, three on the GEO and four more on the Geosynchronous 
Orbit (GSO)36. The system is supposed to provide positioning within the distance up to 
1,500 km from the borders of India, with a capability to expand in the future.  
Summing up, it is worth reminding that the Indian space program is civilian in origin 
and has been developed as such since its inception. That is why its military component is 
largely underdeveloped in comparison with other space-faring nations. For example, China 
operates 203 active satellites; 59 of them are catalogued with the label “military” or “mili-
tary/government”. Such disproportion is striking, but, as we know, it stems from the Indian 
approach to the use of space.  
 
 
32 Earth Observation Satellites; ISRO 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/spacecraft/earth-observation-satellites (ac-
cessed 21.02.2018). 
33 Cartosat 2, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F, Gunther’s Space Page 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/cartosat-
2.htm (accessed: 21.02.2018). 
34 RISAT 1, 1A, Gunther’s Space Page 2018, http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/risat-1.htm (accessed: 
21.02.2018). 
35 This abbreviation may be understood in two ways: firstly, it means “sailor” or “navigator” in Sanskrit; se-
condly, it is an abbreviation for Navigation with Indian Constellation. 
36 Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS): NavIC, ISRO 2018,  https://www.isro.gov.in/irnss-pro-
gramme (accessed 21.02.2018) 




3. India’s Military Space – Needs and Prospects 
Let us reaffirm an important fact which forms the clue to understanding India’s space pro-
gramme – it is an effort oriented mostly to meet national overall development demands. 
The pursuit of international prestige has been another important purpose. This is because 
advanced technology capabilities in space engineering allow India “[...] to derive soft-
power benefits from various achievements in the space area”37. Ambitious scientific mis-
sions, specifically the most prominent interplanetary ventures of the Moon orbiter Chan-
drayaan-1 with its Moon Impact Probe and the Mars orbiter Mangalyaan, successfully 
inserted into the Mars’ orbit in September 2014 and still active38, are supposed to provide 
a solid proof that India is a nation which is developing fast and has great prospects in sight. 
In effect, we might agree in principle that India’s “[...] space policy is not compre-
hensive, in that it deals only with satellite communications [...] and remote sensing”39, 
there is no national space doctrine in the sense of a complete, detailed set of guidelines 
that would contain definitions, assessments of current reality, and programs of activities 
related to proclaimed goals and aims. There are only two short government documents 
that reflect the official space strategy: Satellite Communication Policy issued in 1997 and 
Remote Sensing Data Policy from 201140. There is also no comprehensive strategy to de-
velop space-based military capabilities. That is why the system of national security lacks 
a sufficient number of purpose-built orbital applications which could be effectively used to 
increase the effectiveness of military operations. 
This situation may be considered as at least inconvenient or even dangerous. As we 
have already mentioned, the security problems India faces amass quickly and become in-
creasingly complicated. And while the ambitions and assertiveness of the Indian foreign 
policy grow, the requirements for various military capabilities which satellite systems may 
provide mount. As an Indian expert notes, “[i]gnoring the growing requirements in the 
security domain can be detrimental to India’s strategic interests.”41 The weakness of the 
 
37 A. Lele, Power Dynamic’s of India’s Space Program, “Astropolitics” 2016, vol. 14, no. 2-3 p. 131, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2016.1237212 (accessed: 21.02.2018). 
38 As of February 2018. 
39 K. K. Nair, The Challenge of Indian National Space Policy, “Astropolitics” 2016, vol. 14, no. 2-3  p. 177, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14777622.2016.1242029 (accessed: 21.02.2018). 
40 India’s Space Policy, ISRO 2018, https://www.isro.gov.in/indias-space-policy-0 (accessed: 28.02.2018). 
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Indian military space program has indeed become an obstacle to the development of the 
country’s security policy. It is especially visible once we have noticed that New Delhi is pur-
suing an increasingly active policy of international engagement which is supposed to ele-
vate the country to the role of one of the leading world powers. It requires, among others, 
armed forces able to execute successfully complex and difficult combat and noncombat 
missions while relying on an effective information-gathering mechanism. Satellite systems 
are well suited to support many tasks as a force multiplier during peacetime, in crisis, or in 
the case of regular war. Therefore, the development of military space applications is often 
portrayed in India as a necessity, which also stems from the fact that China is developing 
the same capabilities which must be offset accordingly. As another expert clearly states: 
 “SSA42 and a robust C4ISR43 are the main pillars for a space strategy for India. 
Achieving parity in SSA and C4ISR with other major players is a critical priority. The 
technology gaps will have to be addressed, along with the organizational and in-
stitutional bottlenecks that currently pervade the Indian national security com-
plex. This is an internal challenge that is significantly more complex than any 
challenge from the outside. Major structural changes to deal with the changes in 
the connections between space assets, nuclear war, and conventional war are 
needed. The role of space assets via the C4ISR route is the driver of this reorgani-
zation.”44  
Incorporating space-based capabilities into the list of security issues which have been 
presented above – confined to military problems with the exclusion of other dimensions – 
we could notice the following benefits: 
− Nuclear weapons of China and Pakistan – space assets may be used as means of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), facilitating the assessment of 
the quantity and readiness of the enemy’s nuclear forces; they may also significantly 
contribute to the early warning; robust capability in that field would also foster the 
effectiveness of the deterrence policy, convincing the enemies that India is aware 
of their capabilities and ready to respond accordingly; 
 
42 Space Situational Awareness. 
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− Conventional arms balance vis-a-vis Pakistan – as noted in the paragraph above, ISR 
capabilities may contribute to the gathering of information about the opponent’s 
overall potential and force build-up, thus revealing his intentions; however, because 
of the absence of similar capabilities in the adversary’s inventory, it may unsettle 
Pakistan and make it think that India is gaining advantage and is preparing a first, 
preemptive strike; 
− Chinese military potential in the regions neighbouring China – with respect to that 
effect is similar to that presented above, with one difference stemming from the 
fact that China’s space ISR capabilities are well established; 
− Effectiveness of India’s own armed forces as a deterrent and as a warfighting tool, 
capable of conducting extensive non-combat operations as well – there is no need 
to enumerate all the benefits of space systems acting as a force multiplier, it is 
a well-known issue demonstrated for the first time in full during the operations De-
sert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991; in the modern 
world, space-borne assets are indispensable in every military combat or non-com-
bat activity; 
− the effective control of the Indian Ocean – in connection  with the abovementioned 
role of supporting the military purpose-built military observation and communica-
tion orbital assets may be of a decisive advantage in a tug-of-war for the control 
over that vital area; 
− Irregular warfare and counterterrorism – signals intelligence gathered by purpose-
built military satellites, together with means of disruption of communications and 
observation capabilities may be crucial for the foiling of attacks, ousting rebels from 
their strongholds and neutralizing terrorists. 
Therefore, if the national security of India is to benefit from the country’s own tech-
nological prowess, shortcomings in several crucial areas must be addressed. According to 
a noted Indian expert, the following capabilities need to be augmented: 
− given that space situational awareness, that means the ability to track space objects 
to identify and quantify potential threats, is highly insufficient, this requires the crea-
tion of a robust network of ground-based radar and optical tracking devices; 




− The space-borne segment of C445 system consists in fact of just one dedicated com-
munications satellite, and it is necessary to augment it by advanced systems; three 
geosynchronous satellites for each service, augmented by a constellation of smaller 
satellites operating at lower orbits would be the most practicable solution for that 
purpose; 
− space-based ISR assets are also mostly of civilian origin and need replacement pre-
ferably by constellations of smaller satellites that would be more robust; what is 
more; there is virtually no ELINT46 satellite cluster, and that a serious gap should be 
addressed as well; 
− India should also place telemetry, tracking, and command satellites in space to relay 
information from other orbital systems, and should also augment its weather report-
ing structure by supplementing existing geostationary satellites with the ones oper-
ating on polar orbits.47 
The abovementioned list of needs shows that India should pursue a more assertive 
space security policy to derive benefits from the use of space applications adequate to 
evolving security requirements and to secure space-borne capabilities for their unhindered 
use. This requires concentrated effort and generous funding for all necessary systems. 
Some estimates hold that India needs over 120 satellites (except for a proposed swarm of 
smallsats48) for military purposes – some dual-use, like radar and optical observation, 
weather, or navigation crafts, but most of them purpose-built C4, ELINT, or military com-
munications satellites49. We may surely deem this proposal “plan maximum” designed for 
many years of execution, unrealistic in fact. However, on the other hand, it defines the 
needs according to requirements analyzed against a background of the strategic reality 
and with technical capabilities and political requirements in mind. It is, therefore, an indica-
tion of real needs from a purely military point of view and clearly informative as such.  
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It is rather clear that the current level of utilization of space systems for military purposes 
by India is very low in relation to the engineering potential of the country. Only four pur-
pose-built military satellites, and some dual-use but primarily civilian ones in addition may 
be considered just a demonstration of the technology, not a real asset that could make 
a real difference for India’s security. On the other hand, there is an increasing need to aug-
ment the military space components since security challenges have grown in number and 
significance and activeness in foreign policy has also been on the rise. 
An expansion of the Indian military space capabilities is crucial because growing as-
pirations and amounting problems require more active use of the military to promote the 
country’s interests. The Indian armed forces are poised to fulfil not only their leading com-
bat role of deterrence and defence, but the military must also actively support foreign po-
licy with non-combat missions or low-level combat engagements of a different kind. Other 
countries’ experience shows that satellite systems are crucial for increasing the effective-
ness of militaries in all of their missions. India, as a leading power, must not lag behind 
others in space applications dedicated for military purposes. It is because India without 
these capabilities will not be able to compete with other countries, especially with China. 
Therefore, C4 capabilities, specifically wide-band military communications and ISR assets, 
are necessary to assess an adversary’s potential. Efficient control over the Indian Ocean 
and adjacent straits is also difficult or even impossible without space assets.  All of this is 
not a folly of military planners or overoptimistic space enthusiasts but a strategic necessity. 
Despite all these arguments, India still does not have any comprehensive space pol-
icy, let alone a partial program for the military use of space. However, many aspects of 
space security are being contemplated by the government, including such sensitive issues 
as the weaponization of space50 prompted by a Chinese anti-satellite test conducted in 
2007. That is why the development of similar indigenous weapons systems began in 2010. 
Of course, India is still refining its capabilities, the development of new generation of ob-
servation satellites of the CartoSat and Risat families, and on follow-on communications 
systems are being pursued. India is also augmenting its international co-operation in space, 
 
50 M. Aliberti, India in Space: Between Utility and Geopolitics, Cham 2018, pp. 182-185. 




most notably a fifty-year-old51 collaboration with France. Additionally, the formal agree-
ment on the co-operation between NASA and ISRO was signed in 200852. The most recent 
example is a rapprochement with Japan that entails strong references to space co-opera-
tion53. 
However, still, all abovementioned developments do not translate into prospects 
of a rapid increase of Indian military capabilities. Neither we should also expect any quick 
expansion of New Delhi’s military space programmes, as the space effort will remain orien-
ted mostly towards the needs of overall development of the nation. Therefore, the Indian 
military space capabilities will remain in the foreseeable future, below the requirements 
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